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This  paper  discusses  the  incentive  effect  of  tracking  policies  in  education.  The  results 
contradict the argument by Hanushek and Woessmann (2006), that differences-in-differences 
estimations capture the full impact of tracking. Such estimations capture the gain in education 
between the measurements but neglect the gains before the first measurement. In a standard 
incentive  theory  framework  these  gains  and  their  variance  differ  systematically  between 
tracking and comprehensive systems. In a selective educational system, most students will 
provide  more  effort  in  early  education.  Signaling  considerations  enhance  this  line  of 
argument. As a result, educational tests alone do not reveal the efficiency and distributional 
aspects of educational policies sufficiently. 
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  1.  Introduction 
Tracking  or  selection  policies  in  education  arouse  great  controversy  in  many  countries. 
Hanushek and Woessmann (2006, p. 66) claim that ”[t]he impact of tracking can (...) be 
estimated  by  comparing  the  average  achievement  gain  in  tracked  countries  to  that  in 
untracked countries.” To identify this impact they use differences-in-differences estimations 
across various comparable performance tests to compare educational progress in secondary 
education in countries with different tracking policies. This paper argues that this approach 
neglects student incentives induced by tracking. Therefore, the chosen econometric method is 
not  suitable  to  identify  the  entire  impact  of  tracking.  It  biases  the  results  on  absolute 
performance  in  favor  of  comprehensive  schooling.  On  the  other  hand  it  underestimates 
changes in inequality of outcomes in selective educational systems. Moreover, the strong 
focus on educational tests to identify efficient outcomes in education is questionable. These 
tests provide information on observable output but ignore private costs. Note also that recent 
empirical contributions have questioned the suitability of the approach and the robustness of 
its results (Waldinger, 2006, Manning and Pischke, 2006). 
 
2.  Gaps in marginal educational productivity and Incentives 
Differences-in-differences  require  that  the  first  measurement  point  is  not  affected  by  the 
prospective treatment. In the case of tracking in schools this is not the case. Many children 
(and/or their parents) have clearly an incentive to get into a top-track school. Changes in 
marginal  productivity  after  selection  are  one  motive  why  effort  provision  in  primary 
education depends on the selection policy. Consider the following simple setup, which is 
similar  to  a  bonus  payment  scheme.  Assume  two  schools  enrolling  all  students  in  the 
economy, a student population with mass of unity and a two period educational production. 
The  objective  of  a  policymaker  is  to  maximize  educational  output  after  period  2  (    
                  ) . This output is a function of educational output in period 1 (  ), student 
ability     student  effort  in  period  2         )  and  a  school  parameter              .  For 
simplicity these school parameters are exogenous. Effort is associated with a convex cost 
function      . The expression    ( ) is associated to the school which selects the most (least) 
able students in case of tracking. In case of comprehensive schooling, the parameter is   for 
each  school.  The  following  relation  holds:            ,  otherwise  either  comprehensive 
schooling or tracking would obviously be inefficient. The ability   is uniformly distributed between     and                 .  All  inputs  are  complementary.  The  random  variable     
follows the symmetric, single peaked distribution function       with               . 
Educational output in period 1 is                      , with      . Here, student effort 
follows the convex cost function      . The distribution functions                 are iid. 
Finally assume that selection depends on objective not relative criteria. Any student with 
        can enroll at school with the parameter     Let     be equal to the expected output of a 
student  with  average  ability       
     
  .  Now  the  policy  makers  can  decide  if  tracking  is 
introduced in period 2 (secondary education) and students decide about effort supply in both 
periods. Student utility increases linearly in individual educational output. 
Effort supply in period 2 increases in ability as high ability students have a higher marginal 
productivity. In case of selection these differences in effort supply increase because students 
with a higher ability will also more likely face a better schooling parameter than their less 
able fellow students. As a consequence, the benefits for the high ability people increase with 
selection                                            while  the  low  ability  people  lose  out 
                                       .  This  result  is  observed  by  Hanushek  and 
Woessmann (2006). However, the output gap in period 1 in the case of a tracking policy 
increases as well. The decision problem for a student with ability   in period 1 in the tracking 
scenario is  
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with the resulting first order condition  
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Here   
  describes the optimal effort supply in period 1 in the tracking scenario while   
     (  
 ) 
represents the optimal effort supply in period 2 in case of successfully passing (failing to pass) 
the  selection  threshold.  This  effort  supply  can  be  compared  to  effort  supply  in  a 
comprehensive schooling system. In this case a student’s decision problem in period 1 is  
     
  
                        (3)  
with the first order condition:  
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Now, the following conditions hold 
     
               
           (5)  
     
              
          (6)  
if                       and                       are  sufficiently  close  to  zero.  The 
probability of passing the selection threshold is very low for students with a very low ability, 
hence they are very likely to have secondary education in the lower track with the resulting 
lower marginal productivity. Very able student on the other hand are very likely to meet better 
conditions in period 2 in the tracking scheme, hence they have a higher incentive to provide 
effort in primary education. Since all conditions are the same in the comprehensive and the 
tracking regime, a first result can be established. 
 
Result  1:  The  variation  in  educational  output  in  period  1  is  strictly  larger  in  a  selective 
educational system than in a comprehensive one. 
 
Therefore,  an  estimation  of  differences  in  differences  does  not  fully  capture  the  larger 
educational inequality in selective systems.  
On the other hand, the differences in differences do not fully capture the impact of tracking on 
overall  educational  performance.  Suppose  that  the  expected  marginal  productivity  in 
secondary education for a student with average ability     is identical in the tracking and in the 
comprehensive system. Then, it is clear that this average student provides higher effort in 
period  1.  The  term                                                   
         makes  the 
difference. Given a symmetric distribution of abilities this inequality implies the following 
result 
 
Result 2: The overall educational output in period 1 is strictly larger in a selective educational 
system than in a comprehensive one. 
 
3.  Signaling Incentives 
Labor  market  signals  are  another  argument  why  selection  has  an  impact  on  overall 
performance in the pre-selection period. Selection is likely to provide costless information 
about  ‘raw’  ability  to  future  employers.  Once  selection  has  taken  place,  the  signaling incentives are lower in the selective system. Students know that they are either within the top 
students or that they are not. This selection signal is also informative for future employers and 
restricts their beliefs accordingly. Students from the lowest track of education in Germany 
(the “Hauptschule”) get often summarily rejected from private companies offering vocational 
training. Hence, under ceteris paribus conditions, students in countries with tracking should 
perform better before selection takes place but students in secondary education catch up in 
secondary education. Given the standard set-up of signaling models e.g Spence 1973) it is 
surprising that signaling considerations rarely appear in papers on educational institutions. De 
Fraja and Landeras (2006) have shown that signaling activities can have a serious impact on 
the outcome of educational policies. Future research should work out in detail how signaling 
activities affect equilibrium outcomes and efficiency of tracking policies.  
If signaling and private inputs play a key role for incentives it is even questionable to base an 
efficiency analysis of educational institutions on performance tests alone. Signaling activities 
constitute an overinvestment in education. Myopic decision making or positive externalities 
of  education  may  balance  this  argument  but  the  students’  workload  or  parental  private 
investments should clearly be a part of any welfare analysis.  
4.  Conclusion 
This short paper has sketched the incentive effect of tracking policies in education. The results 
contradict the argument by Hanushek and Woessmann (2006), that differences-in-differences 
estimations can capture the full impact of tracking. These estimations capture the gain in 
education between the measurements but neglect the gains before the first measurement. In a 
standard incentive theory framework these gains differ systematically between tracking and 
comprehensive systems. In a selective educational system, most students will provide more 
effort in early education. Signaling considerations support this line of argument. Observable 
performance measures reveal quite a lot of information about educational institutions but they 
are (not yet) sufficient to identify optimal selection policies.  
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